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Abstract
We study the relationship between randomized low influence functions and differentially private
mechanisms. Our main aim is to formally determine whether differentially private mechanisms are low
influence and whether low influence randomized functions can be differentially private. We show that
differential privacy does not necessarily imply low influence in a formal sense. However, low influence
implies approximate differential privacy. These results hold for both independent and non-independent
randomized mechanisms, where an important instance of the former is the widely-used additive noise
techniques in the differential privacy literature. Our study also reveals the interesting dynamics between
utility, low influence, and independence of a differentially private mechanism. As the name of this paper
suggests, we show that any two such features are simultaneously possible. However, in order to have a
differentially private mechanism that has both utility and low influence, even under a very mild utility
condition, one has to employ non-independent mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 2006, differential privacy [1] has emerged as one of the main frameworks
to design, evaluate, and implement privacy-preserving data analysis methods (see e.g., [2], [3] for
a survey of results). Some highlighted applications of differential privacy are Apple’s large-scale
private learning of users’ preferences and behaviors [4], and the 2020 United States Census’
2privatization method to provide data privacy protection [5], each impacting hundreds of millions
of individuals.
In the differential privacy framework, databases are mapped to randomized query outputs. The
aim of such a randomized mechanism is to make the answer of a query (almost) statistically
indistinguishable regardless of whether an individual participates in the database or not. In other
words, even if an adversary had knowledge of all records in the database before the participation
of a particular individual, they would still have severely limited capability in inferring the private
record of the individual from the query’s output. In the differential privacy literature, this is often
referred to as ensuring individuals in a database have a low influence over the query’s output, see
for example [6], [7]. While this intuitive understanding appears consistent with the definition
of differential privacy, in this paper, we aim to shed light on whether differentially private
mechanisms are low influence mechanisms (or vice versa) in a more formal sense.
A. Are differentially private mechanisms actually low influence?
We begin by revising the definition of differential privacy, formalizing the notion of low
influence, and then examining a toy example to establish our key findings.
Setting: We consider a set D of datasets with a neighborhood relationship. This relationship
is a symmetric relationship on D, denoted by d ∼ d′ whenever d, d′ ∈ D are neighbors. In
the differential privacy literature, a neighborhood is often times defined as two datasets that
differ in only one entry (corresponding to the response from one individual). A mechanism is a
randomized functionM : D → V , where V is referred to as the output space of the mechanism.
Differential Privacy Conditions: A randomized mechanismM : D → V is (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private if for any d ∼ d′, we have Pr[M(d) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(d′) ∈ S] + δ, for every S ⊆ V . In
the original definition [1] δ = 0. The case for δ > 0 is a common relaxation or approximation [1],
[8]. Usually, δ much smaller than 1 is desired. Throughout the paper, we will use the shorthand
(ǫ, δ)-DP instead of both (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy or (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Low Influence Conditions: We propose the following adaptation of the notion of low influence
from [9].1 A randomized mechanism M : D → V is ι-low influence (ι-LI for short) if for any
1This notion is widely used in the fields of social choice theory and in the analysis of Boolean functions [10].
3d ∼ d′, we have Pr[M(d) 6=M(d′)] ≤ ι. In other words, the output of a randomized mechanism
does not change much, statistically speaking, for neighboring datasets. Indeed, if ι = 0, then no
two neighboring datasets can be statistically distinguished.
On Mechanism Independence: In studying the low influence conditions it will be important
whether the mechanism is independent or not. A mechanism is independent if the random
variables {M(di) : di ∈ D} are mutually independent.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the differential privacy framework has been solely based
on independent mechanisms. Indeed, one of the most common ways of constructing differentially
private schemes for continuous-valued queries is to add a noise variable Nu, such as Laplace
or Gaussian noise [1], [3] to the true query output f(d) = u to obtain M(d) = u + Nu. For
discrete queries taking values over a finite field Fq, this construction is equivalent to simulating
noise over a discrete memoryless channel with transition probability Pr[M(d) = v|f(d) = u].
Even if the noise statistics are query-output dependent, as is proposed in [11] (see also [12] for
more discussion), such schemes are still independent mechanisms. This is because the random
variables {Nu} are mutually independent and
Pr[M(di) = vi, · · · ,M(dj) = vj |f(di) = ui, · · · , f(dj) = uj]
decomposes into the product
∏j
ℓ=i Pr[M(dℓ) = vℓ|f(dℓ) = uℓ] for any i, j ∈ {1, · · · , |D|}, i ≤ j.
In this paper, we will consider both independent and general (i.e., non-independent) mechanisms
on D. By a non-independent mechanism, we mean that the random variables {M(di) : di ∈ D}
are in general dependent upon each other.
As alluded to previously, at the surface level, the low influence and differential privacy
conditions may seem synonymous to each other. Our first key observation is that this is not
the case. As it turns out, the low influence and differential privacy conditions do not generally
imply one another. However, low influence does imply in the approximate form of differential
privacy, i.e., for δ > 0. We illustrate this in the following example.
Toy Example: Consider the case where D consists of two neighboring datasets d1 ∼ d2, and
the output space is binary, i.e. V = {1, 2}. For the sake of brevity, let x = Pr[M(d1) = 1] and
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Fig. 1: Figure (a) and (b) illustrate the (ǫ, δ)-DP regions, and Figure (c) shows the ι-LI region
for independent mechanisms, where x = Pr[M(d1) = 1] and y = Pr[M(d2) = 1].
y = Pr[M(d2) = 1]. Thus, the full set of (ǫ, δ)-DP conditions are given by
x ≤ eǫy + δ, y ≤ eǫx+ δ, 1− x ≤ eǫ(1− y) + δ, and 1− y ≤ eǫ(1− x) + δ.
In Figs. 1a and 1b, we show the set of points (x, y) ∈ R2 that satisfy these constraints, for
ǫ = log(2), δ = 0 and for ǫ = 0, δ = 2
5
, respectively.
On the other hand, an independent mechanism is ι-LI if and only if x and y satisfy the
following hyperbolic constraint.
ι ≥ Pr[M(d1) 6=M(d2)] = 1− Pr[M(d1) =M(d2)]
= 1− Pr[M(d1) = 1,M(d2) = 1]− Pr[M(d1) = 2,M(d2) = 2]
= 1− Pr[M(d1) = 1] Pr[M(d2) = 1]− Pr[M(d1) = 2] Pr[M(d2) = 2]
= x+ y − 2xy.
In Fig. 1c, we show the set of points (x, y) ∈ R2 that satisfy this constraint for ι = 2
5
.
Fig. 1 illustrates how, when δ = 0, the (ǫ, δ)-DP region and the ι-LI region are distinct and
neither can be embedded into the other. However, an ι-LI region can be embedded into an
(ǫ, ι)-DP region for any ǫ ≥ 0, meaning that ι-LI implies (ǫ, ι)-DP for independent mechanisms.
This is also true for non-independent mechanisms. Indeed, let x = Pr[M(d1) = 1,M(d2) = 2],
y = Pr[M(d1) = 2,M(d2) = 1], and z = Pr[M(d1) = 1,M(d2) = 1], subject to being inside
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Fig. 2: (ǫ, δ)-DP and ι-LI regions for non-independent mechanisms for δ = ι = 1/2.
the probability simplex: 0 ≤ x+ y + z ≤ 1. To ensure ι-LI, one must have
ι ≥ Pr[M(d1) 6=M(d2)] = 1− Pr[M(d1) =M(d2)]
= 1− Pr[M(d1) = 1,M(d2) = 1]− Pr[M(d1) = 2,M(d2) = 2]
= 1− z − (1− x− y − z) = x+ y.
For brevity, we detail only two of the (ǫ, δ)-DP conditions below
x+ z ≤ eǫ(y + z) + δ and 1− x− z ≤ eǫ(1− y − z) + δ.
Fig. 2 shows the set of points (x, y, z) ∈ R3, which satisfy (0, 1
2
)-DP and 1
2
-LI conditions
(and also belong to the probability simplex). We can see from the figure that the low influence
region, Fig. 2b, is contained in the differential privacy region, Fig. 2a.
B. What about the relationship between low influence and utility?
In application, randomized mechanisms are generally used to approximate some function of
interest. This approximation is often measured through some notion of utility, which is highly
dependent on the application. It is then natural to ask if ι-LI mechanisms can be useful, i.e. can
a mechanism have utility while being low influence. It turns out that the answer to this heavily
depends on whether the mechanism is independent, operating on single datasets, or not, jointly
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Fig. 3: Figure (a) illustrates how an independent mechanism can only have arbitrarily low
influence if it is trivial, i.e. x and y are both close to 0 or close to 1. Figure (b) shows that
the influence for a nontrivial independent mechanism, i.e. belonging to the red region R, is
lower bounded by the influence in the blue boundary region S, denoted by I(S). We show that
I(S) = 1
2
.
operating on the space of datasets. To formalize this, we introduce a universal notion of utility
without being too restrictive. Roughly speaking, we say a mechanism is nontrivial if the most
likely output of the mechanism shows some variability across the datasets. Let us continue with
the toy example.
Toy Example Continued: We say the binary mechanism operating on d1 ∼ d2 is nontrivial
if outputting v = 0 is more likely when the database is d1 and outputting v = 1 is more likely
when the database is d2 (or vice versa).
2
Looking again at independent mechanisms, and setting x = Pr[M(d1) = 1] and y =
Pr[M(d2) = 1], a mechanism is nontrivial if x ≥ 1 − x and y ≤ 1 − y (or vice versa).
Without loss of generality, let us assume that x ≥ 1
2
and y ≤ 1
2
.3 It turns out that minimizing
the influence function of the independent mechanism I(x, y) = x + y − 2xy subject to x ≥ 1
2
and y ≤ 1
2
leads to min I(x, y) = 1
2
. Thus, if an independent mechanism is ι-LI, then ι ≥ 1
2
.
This result is illustrated in Figure 3. In Section III, we show that this is also true for non-binary
mechanisms. Thus, nontrivial independent mechanisms cannot be arbitrarily low influence.
2If the most likely query output is v = 0 (or v = 1) regardless of d1 or d2, then there will be no need to query and a fixed
guess will always give the maximum likelihood outcome.
3To satisfy the nontriviality condition, we additionally assume x and y cannot simultaneously be equal to 1
2
.
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Fig. 4: Nontrivial non-independent mechanisms can have arbitrarily low influence.
However, if we consider general mechanisms, we can achieve both low influence ι < 1
2
and
a nontrivial utility. Let x = Pr[M(d1) = 1,M(d2) = 2], y = Pr[M(d1) = 2,M(d2) = 1], and
z = Pr[M(d1) = 1,M(d2) = 1], subject to the probability simplex: 0 ≤ x + y + z ≤ 1. Fig. 4
illustrates how the nontrivial region specified by x+ z > 1
2
and y + z < 1
2
(Fig. 4b) intersects
with the 1
2
-LI region specified by x + y ≤ 1
2
(Fig. 4a). This holds true in general, i.e., for any
influence ι > 0.
C. Bringing the message home
The toy example illustrates the interesting relationships and tensions between influence, differ-
ential privacy, utility and the independence property for randomized mechanisms. To understand
the landscape of randomized mechanisms, we consider general mechanisms, beyond independent
mechanisms, and characterize precisely how each notion relates to another. In particular, we show
the following.
1) Independent nontrivial mechanisms cannot be ι-LI, for ι < 1
2
. In particular, additive noise
mechanisms often used for differential privacy cannot be simultaneously low influence and
useful.
2) Low influence mechanisms are differentially private. More specifically, ι-LI finite output
mechanisms are (0, δ)-DP, for δ = ι(|V| − 1).
8Nontrivial Low Influence
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Fig. 5: A differentially private mechanism can satisfy any two of the properties, but not all three.
3) There exist non-independent mechanisms which are simultaneously (ǫ, δ)-DP, ι-LI, and
nontrivial.
Together, these results form a more complete taxonomy of randomized mechanisms and
their properties. An important consequence is that, while independent mechanisms may be
sufficient for differential privacy, they fall short when one wants to design mechanisms that
satisfy additional properties. The low influence condition is one instance that exemplifies the
opportunities that arise from studying general non-independent randomized mechanisms. In
other words, when restricting randomized mechanisms to satisfy additional conditions, e.g. low-
influence, fairness, or composition rules, it might be necessary to move away from independent
mechanisms to achieve the best performance.
Additionally, it turns out that it is possible to characterize the space of general joint mech-
anisms, at least for mechanisms with finite inputs and outputs. While this space has a larger
dimension due to the increased number of degrees of freedom, we show that this increased
dimensionality may be a blessing, rather than a curse. For example, we shall show that the ι-LI
property can be expressed as a linear constraint over the space of general mechanisms – a fact
that is no longer true if one restricts oneself to independent mechanisms.
The relationship between independence, differential privacy, triviality, and low influence is
represented graphically in Figure 5. The green edge signifies independent and useful mechanisms
that are prevalent in differential privacy literature (but cannot be arbitrarily low influence). The red
edge signifies the subset of independent differentially private mechanisms that can be arbitrarily
9low influence, but are trivial (hence, not useful). The results of this paper advocate for further
studying non-independent differentially private mechanisms (existing on the blue edge) that can
be jointly low influence and useful.
D. Notation and Problem Setup
We use [k] to denote the set {1, 2, · · · , k}. We denote by D the space of databases and often
enumerate them as D = {d1, . . . , d|D|}. We consider a symmetric neighborhood relationship in
D where di, dj ∈ D are said to be neighbors if di ∼ dj . When clear from context, we use
the shorthand notation d, d′ to refer to two generic neighboring datasets. In many applications,
D = Fn2 and two databases d, d
′ ∈ Fn2 are neighbors if they differ in one element.
To avoid degenerate cases, in this paper, we only consider spaces of databases with at least two
datasets and which are connected, i.e. for any two d and d′ in D, there exists a finite sequence
d = d1, . . . , dk = d
′, such that di ∼ di+1 for i ∈ [1 : k − 1].
We also consider a finite output space V which corresponds to the space over which the
output of the queries lie. A few remarks are in order about finite output mechanisms, which
are relatively less studied in the differential privacy literature compared to continuous-output or
countable discrete-output mechanisms. Adding continuous noise to an inherently discrete-valued
query (such as a counting query) and post processing may make the output less reliable. With the
adoption of differential privacy framework for the US Census, there is emerging motivation to
either understand existing discrete privacy-preserving mechanisms through the lens of differential
privacy [13] or propose new discrete and finite-valued mechanisms. In this context, the Geometric
distribution has been studied in [14]–[16] as the discrete counterpart to the Laplace distribution.
The Differential privacy properties of the discrete Gaussian distribution was recently studied
in [17]. However, the support of the noise is the entirety of Z, which may lead to undesirable
outcomes. For example, according to a recent article in the New York Times [18], the population
of a county in the 2010 US Census was over-reported by a factor of almost 8. Post-processing
(truncating or folding the probability mass function) can be used to limit the range of a discrete
mechanism [19]. However, such an approach may not be tailored to the problem at hand. A
recent work [20] has reported an optimized discrete distribution for counting queries with a
10
Symbol Definition
M A random mechanism.
D Set of datasets.
V Output set of the mechanism.
d ∈ D A dataset.
v ∈ V An output value.
(ǫ, δ) Differential privacy parameters.
ι Low influence parameter.
x, y, z Coordinates of the Euclidean space R3.
I Set of independent mechanisms.
M Set of general mechanisms.
TABLE I: List of the main symbols used with their descriptions.
finite range as low as |V| = 8 that can outperform the discrete Gaussian distribution in terms of
privacy-utility tradeoff.
In Table I we list the main symbols used throughout this paper together with their description.
II. A CLASSIFICATION OF RANDOMIZED MECHANISMS
A. Independent versus Joint Mechanisms
Randomized mechanisms are a key notion in differential privacy. In the literature, these have
usually been defined as we do in Definition 2. We, however, refer to them as independent
mechanisms. The reason for this is that, in Definition 3, we present a more general notion of
mechanism, which we call joint mechanisms. These more general mechanisms are needed for
the results in Sections IV and V.
We begin by defining independent mechanisms.
Definition 1. Given a finite set V , the probability simplex over V is the set
∆(V) =

λ = (λ1, · · · , λ|V|) ∈ R|V| : λi ≥ 0 for all i, and
|V|∑
i=1
λi = 1

 .
Definition 2. An independent mechanism M with domain D and range V is associated with
a mapping g : D → ∆(V). On input d ∈ D, the randomized mechanism outputs v ∈ V with
probability Pr[M(d) = v]. We denote the set of independent mechanisms by I.
11
An independent mechanism M : D → V is solely determined by the marginal probabilities
Mij
.
= Pr[M(di) = vj ], which can be arranged in a |D|× |V| stochastic matrix. In other words,
I ∼=

M ∈ R|D|×|V| : Mij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ [|D|]× [|V|],
|V|∑
j=1
Mij = 1, i ∈ [|D|]

 .
Because of this relation, we often identify I with its isomorphic subset of R|D|×|V|.
Note that independent mechanisms contain both (less common) query-output-dependent mech-
anisms, such as [11] (see also [12] for more discussion) and query-output-independent mecha-
nisms that are much more commonplace in the differential privacy literature. For discrete queries
taking values over a finite field Fq, we say an (additive) independent mechanism operating on
the true query output f(d) is query-output-independent if for all u, v ∈ Fq and d ∈ D, we have
Pr[M(d) = v|f(d) = u] = Pr[N = v − u], where N is an independent noise variable whose
distribution does not depend on u. We say an (additive) independent mechanism operating on
the true query output f(d) is query-output-dependent if for all u, v ∈ Fq and d ∈ D, we have
Pr[M(d) = v|f(d) = u] = Pr[Nu = v − u], where Nu is an independent noise variable whose
distribution depends on u. We refer to both such mechanisms as independent because, as for all
independent mechanisms, the random variables {M(d) : d ∈ D} are mutually independent.
This is not the case for the joint mechanisms we now define.
Definition 3. A joint randomized mechanism M : D → V is defined by the joint probabilities
Pr[M(d1) = v1, . . . ,M(d|D|) = v|D|] for every (v1, . . . , v|D|) ∈ V
|D|. We denote the set of joint
mechanisms by M.
A joint mechanism M : D → V is solely determined by the joint probabilities of the form
Pv1,...,v|D|
.
= Pr[M(d1) = v1, . . . ,M(d|D|) = v|D|]. Thus,
M ∼=
{
Pv1,...,v|D| ∈ R
|V||D| : Pv1,...,v|D| ≥ 0, for every (v1, . . . , v|D|) ∈ V
|D| and
∑
(v1,...,v|D|)∈V |D|
Pv1,...,v|D| = 1
}
. (1)
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Because of this relation, we often identify M with its isomorphic subset of R|V|
|D|
.
Clearly the set of joint mechanisms contains the class of independent mechanisms as a special
case. That is, for an independent mechanism and for every (v1, . . . , v|D|) ∈ V
|D|, we have
Pr[M(d1) = v1, . . . ,M(d|D|) = v|D|] =
|D|∏
i=1
Pr[M(di) = vi].
We have already identified the space of independent mechanisms I with a subset of R|D|×|V|,
and the space of general mechanismsM with a subset of R|V|
|D|
. Since an independent mechanism
is a special case of joint mechanism, it is clear that there must exist a subset of M isomorphic
to I. We characterize this subset in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. It holds that,
I ∼=
{
Pv1,...,v|D| ∈M : Pv1,...,v|D| =
|D|∏
i=1
∑
(w1,...,w|D|)∈V
|D|:wi=vi
Pw1,...,w|D|,
for every (v1, . . . , v|D|) ∈ V
|D|
}
.
In other words, I is a polynomial of degree |D| in R|V|
|D|
.
Proof. Let P ∈M where Pv1,...,v|D| = Pr[M(d1) = v1, . . .M(d|D|) = v|D|]. Then,
Pr[M(dk) = v] =
∑
(w1,...,w|D|)∈V
|D|:wk=v
Pw1,...,w|D|.
Thus, the mechanism is independent if and only if
Pv1,...,v|D| =
|D|∏
i=1
∑
(w1,...,w|D|)∈V |D|:wi=vi
Pw1,...,w|D|, for every (v1, . . . , v|D|) ∈ V
|D|.
Not to confuse the previous identifications, we refer to the space in the above proposition
as IM. The statement of the proposition is then equivalent to I ∼= IM ⊂ M. Throughout the
paper, when we refer to a mechanism without specification, we mean a joint mechanism as these
include independent ones.
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We finish this section by showing a different characterization of randomized mechanisms.
Proposition 2. A randomized mechanism is equivalent to a probability distribution on the space
of all functions h : D → V .
Proof. The space of functions from h : D → V is isomorphic to the space V |D|. Indeed, if we
order D = {d1, . . . , d|D|}, then each vector (v1, . . . , v|D|) ∈ V
|D| corresponds to the function
h : D → V such that h(d1) = v1, . . . , h(d|D|) = v|D|. By equation 1, every P ∈ M is a
probability distribution on V |D|. Thus, using the above equivalence, every mechanism P ∈M is
a probability distribution on the space of functions from h : D → V .
B. Differential Privacy, Low Influence, and Trivial Mechanisms
In this section we define different families of mechanisms. We begin by differential privacy.
Definition 4. A mechanismM : D → V is (ǫ, δ)-DP if, for any two neighboring datasets d ∼ d′,
we have Pr[M(d) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(d′) ∈ S] + δ, for every S ⊆ V .
We also use the following notion.
Definition 5. A mechanism M : D → V is (ǫ, δ)-value differentially private, or (ǫ, δ)-VDP in
short, if for any two neighboring d ∼ d′, we have Pr[M(d) = v] ≤ eǫPr[M(d′) = v] + δ, for
every v ∈ V .
A mechanism which is value differentially private is also differentially private.
Proposition 3. Let the mechanism M be (ǫ, δ)-VDP. Then, M is (ǫ, (|V| − 1)δ)-DP.
Proof. Since M is (ǫ, δ)-VDP, it follows that Pr[M(d) = v] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(d′) = v] + δ, for every
neighboring datasets d ∼ d′. But then, for every neighboring datasets d ∼ d′,
Pr[D(d) ∈ S] =
∑
v∈S
Pr[D(d) = v] ≤
∑
v∈S
(eǫ Pr[D(d′) = v] + δ)
= eǫ Pr[D(d′) ∈ S] + |S|δ.
Since the differential privacy condition trivially holds for S = V , we can upper bound |S| by
|V| − 1, proving the result.
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In Definition 7, we present the notion of low influence mechanisms. This notion is an adap-
tation of the following definition, widely used in social choice theory and in the analysis of
Boolean functions.
Definition 6. The influence of coordinate i on a function f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} is defined
as the probability Inf i[f ] = Pr[f(x) 6= f(x
⊕i)], where x is a uniformly distributed vector from
{−1, 1}n, and x⊕i is the vector such that x⊕ii = −xi and x
⊕i
k = xk for k ∈ [n]− {i}.
If one thinks of f as a voting rule, i.e., a rule for determining how to interpret n votes for
two candidates {−1, 1} as an election of one of them, then the influence Inf i[f ] measures the
probability that the i-th voter will affect the outcome of the election. In this context, we say a
function f is ι-low influence if Inf i[f ] ≤ ι for every i ∈ [n].
We note that the probability in the above definition is taken over the argument of the function,
and that the function itself is deterministic. The opposite is true in the differential privacy setup.
To account for this, we propose the following adaptation.
Definition 7. A mechanism M : D → V is ι-low influence, or ι-LI in short, if for any two
neighboring datasets d ∼ d′, we have Pr[M(d) 6=M(d′)] ≤ ι.
Finally, we define nontrivial mechanisms as a randomized generalization of non-constant
mechanisms. More precisely, we say a mechanism is nontrivial if its most likely output is not
constant across datasets.
Definition 8. A mechanismM : D → V is nontrivial if there exists neighboring datasets d ∼ d′
such that argmaxv Pr[M(d) = v] 6= argmaxv Pr[M(d
′) = v].
Note that this definition of nontriviality is very mild. In practice, the utility of a mechanism is
application dependent, and the mechanism being nontrivial is not sufficient, but rather necessary.
III. NONTRIVIAL INDEPENDENT MECHANISMS ARE NOT LOW INFLUENCE
In this section, we show that if an independent mechanism is nontrivial, then it cannot be low
influence. We begin by showing that although differential privacy is equivalent to a set of linear
constraints on I, low influence is equivalent to a set of quadratic constraints.
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Proposition 4. Let M : D → V be an independent mechanism with matrix representation
Mij = Pr[M(di) = vj ]. Then, M is (ǫ, δ)-DP if and only if, for every di ∼ dk,
∑
j:vj∈S
Mij ≤ e
ǫ
∑
j:vj∈S
Mkj + δ for every S ⊆ V .
Similarly, M is (ǫ, δ)-VDP if and only if, for every di ∼ dk, it holds that Mij ≤ e
ǫMkj + δ,
for every j ∈ [|V|]. In other words, both (ǫ, δ)-DP and (ǫ, δ)-VDP are linear constraints in the
space I.
Proof. This follows directly from substituting Mij = Pr[M(di) = vj] into the definitions of
(ǫ, δ)-DP and (ǫ, δ)-VDP.
Proposition 5. Let M : D → V be an independent mechanism with matrix representation
Mij = Pr[M(di) = vj ]. Then M is ι-LI if and only if, for every di ∼ dk,
|V|∑
j=1
MijMkj ≥ 1− ι.
In other words, ι-LI conditions are quadratic constraints over the space I.
Proof. By the definition of ι-LI, for every di ∼ dk,
ι ≥ Pr[M(di) 6=M(dk)] = 1− Pr[M(di) =M(dk)]
= 1−
|V|∑
j=1
Pr[M(di) = j,M(dk) = j]
= 1−
|V|∑
j=1
Pr[M(di) = j] Pr[M(dk) = j]
= 1−
|V|∑
j=1
MijMkj .
Before we prove the main result of this section, let us revisit the toy example from the
Introduction. We show that for our toy example, a nontrivial mechanism is not ι-LI for ι < 1
2
.
Example 1. Consider the case where D consists of two neighboring datasets d1 ∼ d2, and the
16
output space is binary, i.e. V = {1, 2}. To be consistent with the simpler notation in the toy
example in the Introduction, let x
.
= M11 = Pr[M(d1) = 1] and y
.
= M21 = Pr[M(d2) = 1].
Suppose M is nontrivial. Then, either (i) 1
2
≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
2
or (ii) 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2
and
1
2
≤ y ≤ 1. Recall that we additionally assume x and y cannot simultaneously be equal to 1
2
.
Without loss of generality, we consider case (i) and denote
R∗ =
{
(x, y) ∈ R2 :
1
2
≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤
1
2
}
. (2)
Let I : R2 → R be given by I(x, y) = x + y − 2xy. Then, a mechanism is ι-LI if and only if
I(x, y) ≤ ι. Consider the following constrained quadratic optimization problem.
minimize I(x, y) = x+ y − 2xy
subject to
1
2
≤ x ≤ 1,
0 ≤ y ≤
1
2
.
(3)
The solution to this problem is the minimum influence that a nontrivial mechanism can have.
We show that the solution to this problem is the set
S =
{(
1
2
, t
)
: t ∈
[
0,
1
2
[}⋃{(
t,
1
2
)
: t ∈
]
1
2
, 1
]}
,
with I(S) = 1
2
. To do this, we look at the direction of fastest decrease, −∇I = (2y−1, 2x−1).
Note that if (x, y) ∈ R∗ − S then −(∇I)x < 0 and −(∇I)y > 0. This means that, for every
point (x, y) ∈ R∗ the direction −∇I(x, y) points towards S. Thus, the solution space of the
optimization problem (3) must be contained in S. A direct calculation shows that I(S) = 1
2
,
concluding that nontrivial mechanisms cannot have influence smaller than 1
2
. We illustrate this
in Fig. 3b.
The lower bound in the example above holds true in general.
Theorem 1. Let M : D → V be an independent, ι-LI, nontrivial mechanism. Then, ι ≥ 1
2
.
Furthermore, this bound is tight.
Proof. We present the full proof in the Appendix. The main idea behind the proof is to char-
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acterize the set of nontrivial schemes R and show that the minimum influence in that set is
equivalent to the minimum influence in the set R∗ of Example 1. Thus, ι ≥ 1
2
.
We note that we can obtain a looser lower-bound using a simpler argument.
Proposition 6. Let M : D → V be independent, nontrivial, and ι-LI. Then, ι ≥ 1
|V|2
.
Proof. Since M is nontrivial, there exists neighboring datasets d1 ∼ d2 and two different values
v1, v2 ∈ V such that Pr[M(d1) = v1] ≥ 1/|V| and Pr[M(d2) = v2] ≥ 1/|V|. Then,
Pr[M(d1) 6=M(d2)] ≥ Pr[M(d1) = v1,M(d2) = v2]
= Pr[M(d1) = v1] Pr[M(d2) = v2]
≥
1
|V|
1
|V|
=
1
|V|2
.
The bound in Theorem 1 is strictly larger than the bound above for |V| > 2. The following
bound, however, can sometimes outperform the bound in Theorem 1 and is not restricted only
to nontrivial mechanisms.
Proposition 7. Let the mechanism M : D → V be independent and ι-LI. Then,
ι ≥ 1−min
d∈D
max
v∈V
Pr[M(d) = v].
Proof. Let I be the function in Definition 9 and denote Mij = Pr[M(di) = vj ]. Then,
I(Mi,Mk) = 1−
|V|∑
j=1
MijMkj ≥ 1−min
(
max
j∈[|V|]
Mij, max
j∈[|V|]
Mkj
)
≥ 1− min
l∈[|D|]
max
j∈[|V|]
Mlj = 1−min
d∈D
max
v∈[V ]
Pr[M(d) = v].
But by Lemma 1, M is ι-LI if and only if I(Mi,Mk) ≤ ι for every di ∼ dk. Thus,
ι ≥ 1−min
d∈D
max
v∈V
Pr[M(d) = v].
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This bound can be better than the one in Theorem 1, if mind∈Dmaxv∈V Pr[M(d) = v] <
1
2
.
At best, mind∈Dmaxv∈V Pr[M(d) = v] =
1
|V|
. At worst, it could be arbitrarily close to the trivial
bound of 1. Thus, although it can sometimes outperform the bound in Theorem 1, it cannot
guarantee that the mechanism is bounded away from 0, as Theorem 1 does.
In Section V, we show that nontrivial mechanisms can be low influence if the mechanisms
are not-independent.
IV. LOW INFLUENCE MECHANISMS ARE DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE
In this section, we show that low influence functions are differentially private. We will not
restrict ourselves to only independent mechanism, considering joint mechanisms too. We begin
by showing that any linear constraint on I is also linear on M.
Proposition 8. If a constraint is linear on I, it is linear on M. In particular, both (ǫ, δ)-DP
and (ǫ, δ)-VDP are linear on M.
Proof. Let P ∈ M with Pv1,...,v|D| = Pr[M(d1) = v1, . . .M(d|D|) = v|D|] and M ∈ I with
Mkj = Pr[M(dk) = vj ]. Then,
Mkj = Pr[M(dk) = vj ] =
∑
(w1,...,w|D|)∈V
|D|:wk=vj
Pw1,...,w|D|.
Thus, each Mkj is a linear combination of Pv1,...,v|D| .
Thus, looking at M does not complicate the differential privacy constraints. Indeed, it will
also simplify the low influence constraints into linear constraints in the space M (which were
non-linear in the space I). Proposition 1 explains why the low influence constraints are linear
on M, but non-linear (quadratic) on I. This is illustrated in Figure 6 for |V| = 2.
Proposition 9. Let M : D → V such that Pv1,...,v|D| = Pr[M(d1) = v1, . . . ,M(d|D|) = v|D|].
Then M is ι-LI if and only if, for every di ∼ dk,
∑
(v1,...,v|D|)∈V
|D|:vi 6=vk
Pv1,...,v|D| ≤ ι.
In other words, ι-LI is a linear constraint in the space M.
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Fig. 6: For |V| = 2, Figure (a) shows the region for low influence in the space of general
(joint) mechanisms. Figure (b) shows the surface of independent mechanisms. Figure (c) can be
interpreted as an intersection of (a) and (b), and shows the region for low influence in the space
of independent mechanisms.
Proof. The mechanism M is ι-LI if and only if, for any two neighboring datasets di ∼ dk,
ι ≥ Pr[M(di) 6=M(dk)] =
∑
(v1,...,v|D|)∈V
|D|:vi 6=vk
Pv1,...,v|D| .
We revisit the toy example in the introduction and show that ι-LI implies in (0, ι)-DP.
Example 2. Consider the case where D consists of two neighboring datasets d1 ∼ d2, and the
output space is binary, i.e. V = {1, 2}. A general mechanismM : D → V is then determined by
the matrix P =
(
P11 P12
P21 P22
)
, where Pij = Pr[M(d1) = i,M(d2) = j]. We note that the marginals
are given by Pr[M(d1) = k] = Pk1 + Pk2 and Pr[M(d2) = k] = P1k + P2k. Thus, a simple
calculation shows that, M is (0, δ)-DP if and only if |P12 − P21| ≤ δ, i.e. if the entries in
the anti-diagonal of P are close. By Proposition 9, the mechanism M is ι-LI if and only if
P12+P21 ≤ ι, i.e. if the sum of the entries in the anti-diagonal of P is close to zero. Thus, since
|P12 − P21| ≤ P12 + P21 ≤ ι, it follows that if the mechanism M is ι-LI, it is also (0, ι)-DP.
The statement in the example above holds true in general. We first prove it for value differential
privacy and then combine it with Proposition 3 to prove the general result.
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P11 P12 P13 P14
P21 P22 P23 P24
P31 P32 P33 P34
P41 P42 P43 P44
(a) (0, δ)-VDP
P11 P12 P13 P14
P21 P22 P23 P24
P31 P32 P33 P34
P41 P42 P43 P44
(b) ι-Low Influence
Fig. 7: The main idea behind the proof of Proposition 10. The elements of the matrix signify
Pij = Pr[M(d1) = vi,M(d1) = vj]. In Figure (a), (0, δ)-VDP requires the difference between
the sum of row k and column k to be small. In Figure (b), ι-LI requires the sum of all non-
diagonal elements to be small. The latter implies the former. However, one can easily construct
counterexample to show the reverse is generally not true.
Proposition 10. Let M : D → V be an ι-LI mechanism. Then, M is (0, ι)-VDP.
Proof. Let d1, d2 ∈ D be two neighboring databases and P be the joint probability matrix given
by Pij = Pr[M(d1) = vi,M(d2) = vj ]. Then, for every k ∈ [|V|],
ι ≥ Pr[M(d1) 6=M(d2)] =
∑
(i,j):i 6=j
Pij
≥
∑
i 6=k
Pki + Pik ≥
∑
i 6=k
|Pki − Pik|
≥
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i 6=k
Pki − Pik
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j
Pkj −
∑
i
Pik
∣∣∣∣∣ .
But
∑
j Pkj = Pr[M(d1) = vk] and
∑
i Pik = Pr[M(d2) = vk]. Thus,
Pr[M(d1) = vk] ≤ Pr[M(d2) = vk] + ι and Pr[M(d2) = vk] ≤ Pr[M(d1) = vk] + ι,
for every k ∈ V , i.e., M is (0, ι)-value differentially private.
Theorem 2. Let M : D → V be an ι-LI mechanism. Then, M is (0, ι(|V| − 1))-DP.
Proof. Follows directly from Propositions 3 and 10.
The idea behind Proposition 10 is shown in Fig. 7. The ι-LI conditions require that for any two
d1 ∼ d2, the sum of non-diagonal elements of the joint probability matrix Pij = Pr[M(d1) =
vi,M(d1) = vj ] be smaller than ι. On the other hand, (0, ι)-VDP conditions require that for all
k ∈ [|V|], the difference between the sum of row k and the sum of column k of the same matrix
be small. Clearly, if the sum of all non-diagonal elements is small, the difference between the
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sum of any two subsets of non-diagonal elements is also small. For value differential privacy,
it suffices to consider the difference between the sum of row k and column k, noting that the
diagonal element Pkk (which could be large) will cancel out in the difference.
In most practical (ǫ, δ)-DP scenarios, the value of δ should be rather small, e.g., in the order
of 10−3. According to Theorem 10, setting ι = δ
|V|−1
when designing a low influence mechanism
will ensure the desired δ. However, this method is only valid for (ǫ, δ)-DP with δ > 0. Indeed,
if one desires δ = 0, i.e. the classical ǫ-DP condition, a mechanism being low-influence is not
sufficient to guarantee privacy unless ι = 0.
V. USEFUL LOW INFLUENCE DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE SCHEMES
Most problems in differential privacy exhibit a tradeoff between privacy and some notion
of utility. This is typically captured by a utility function U : M → R, which is a function
from the space of randomized mechanisms to the real-values which usually captures how well a
randomized mechanism approximates a desired output if no privacy mechanism was to be put in
place. Problems in differential privacy can then be formulated as: maximize
M∈M
U(M), subject to
differential privacy constraint, and potentially other practical constraints. Obviously, the structure
of the optimization problem, its computational complexity, and the overall efficacy of the solution
are three important considerations when designing differentially private mechanisms.
As shown in Proposition 8, every linear constraint on the space of independent mechanisms
I is also linear on the space of joint mechanisms M. In particular, (ǫ, δ)-DP and (ǫ, δ)-VDP are
linear constraints over both I and M. However, the opposite is not true. As we have seen, low
influence constraints are linear over M, but non-linear over I. Linear conditions are desired as
efficient linear program solvers can be used to find the solution.
This simplicity in the constraints comes at the price of dimensionality. The degrees of freedom
in independent mechanisms is O(|D| × |V|), whereas the degrees of freedom in general joint
mechanisms is O(|V||D|). Clearly, the desired linearity and increase in the degrees of freedom
come at the cost of computational complexity. Solving the tradeoff between performance and
complexity in designing joint mechanisms is an interesting topic of research, but is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, in the remainder of this section we motivate the potential
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benefits of considering general joint mechanisms. We start by a general result on the existence
of nontrivial mechanisms with arbitrarily low influence (which according to Theorem 1 must
necessarily be non-independent).
Theorem 3. There exists nontrivial mechanisms M : D → V with arbitrarily low influence.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let D = {d1, . . . , d|D|} such that d1 ∼ d2, V = {1, . . . , |V|},
and choose 0 < α < 1. Consider the mechanism Pv1,...,v|D| ∈M such that P1,...,1 = P2,...,2 =
1−α
2
,
P1,2,1,...,1 = α, and Pv1,...,v|D| = 0 for the other (v1, . . . , v|D|) ∈ V
|D|. Then,
Pr[M(d1) = 1] =
∑
(v1,...,v|D|)∈V
|D|:v1=1
Pv1,...,v|D| = P1,...,1 + P1,2,1,...,1 =
1
2
+
α
2
and
Pr[M(d2) = 2] =
∑
(v1,...,v|D|)∈V
|D|:v2=2
Pv1,...,v|D| = P2,...,2 + P1,2,1,...,1 =
1
2
+
α
2
.
Since both values are larger than 1/2, it follows that
argmax
v∈V
Pr[M(d1) = v] = 1 6= 2 = argmax
v∈V
Pr[M(d2) = v].
And thus, M is nontrivial.
We now show that M is α-LI. This follows directly from the fact that
∑
(v1,...,v|D|)∈V |D|:vi 6=vk
Pv1,...,v|D| =

P1,2,1,...,1 = α if vi = 2 or vk = 2,0 otherwise.
In the following, we illustrate how considering joint versus independent mechanisms can
impact the optimization.
Example 3. Let D consist of two neighboring datasets d1 ∼ d2 and the output set be the binary
set V = {1, 2}. We consider the utility function given by U(M) = Pr[M(d1) = 1] with the
balancing constraint that Pr[M(d1) = 1] = Pr[M(d2) = 2]. Restricting ourselves to independent
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Fig. 8: The privacy-utility-influence tradeoff for joint and independent mechanisms. While
independent mechanisms are sufficient to achieve the best privacy-utility tradeoff, they fall short
in terms of influence – for any utility level, there is a joint scheme which achieves the same
privacy and a lower influence.
mechanisms we consider the following optimization problem.
maximize
M∈I
U(M)
subject to M satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP and
M is balanced.
Using the characterization of I given in Proposition 2, and setting x = Pr[M(d1) = 1] =
Pr[M(d2) = 2], the optimization problem is as follows.
maximize
x∈R
x
subject to x ≤ eǫ(1− x) + δ
(1− x) ≤ eǫx+ δ
0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
The solution to this optimization problem is x∗ = e
ǫ+δ
eǫ+1
. As we previously saw, the influence
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of this mechanism is lower bounded by 1
2
. Indeed, the influence is given by
I(x∗) = 1−
2(1− δ)(eǫ + δ)
(eǫ + 1)2
≥
1
2
.
We now show that if we consider general mechanisms, we can lower the influence.
Example 4. Let D consist of two neighboring datasets d1 ∼ d2 and the output set be the
binary set V = {1, 2}. We consider the utility function given by U(M) = Pr[M(d1) = 1]
with the balancing constraint that Pr[M(d1) = 1] = Pr[M(d2) = 2]. We now consider general
mechanisms.
maximize
M∈M
U(M)
subject to M satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP and
M is balanced.
Using the characterization ofM given in Proposition 3, and setting x = Pr[M(d1) = 1,M(d2) =
2] and y = Pr[M(d1) = 2,M(d2) = 1], the optimization problem is as follows.
maximize
(x,y)∈R2
1 + x− y
2
subject to
1 + x− y
2
≤ eǫ
1 + y − x
2
+ δ
1 + y − x
2
≤ eǫ
1 + x− y
2
+ δ
0 ≤ x ≤ 1
0 ≤ y ≤ 1
0 ≤ x+ y ≤ 1.
If we also minimize the influence, given by I(x, y) = x+ y, we get the solution x∗ = e
ǫ+2δ−1
eǫ+1
and y∗ = 0 with influence
I(x∗, y∗) =
eǫ + 2δ − 1
eǫ + 1
≤ 1−
2(1− δ)(eǫ + δ)
(eǫ + 1)2
.
Note that for ǫ = 0 and δ = 0, I(x, y) = 0. Thus, in this case, the influence is not lower bounded.
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In Figure 8 we show the optimal tradeoffs between (ǫ, 0)-DP, the utility U(M), and the
influence ι of joint, and independent randomized mechanisms. Note that this tradeoff can be
obtained by letting δ = 0 in the solutions in Examples 3 and 4, and by then varying the value
of ǫ. As can be seen in the figure, both independent and joint mechanisms exhibit the same
privacy-utility tradeoff, i.e. for any ǫ, there is an (ǫ, 0)-DP independent mechanism that achieves
the same utility as the best (ǫ, 0)-DP joint mechanism. On the other hand, joint mechanisms
achieve a strictly better optimal tradeoff in terms of their influence ι. That is, while independent
mechanisms are sufficient to achieve the optimal privacy (captured by the parameter ǫ in the
(ǫ, 0)-DP guarantee) and utility tradeoff, they fall short at providing the best influence level ι.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The study in this paper reveals the interesting interactions between differential privacy and
utility, on the one hand, and mechanism influence and independence on the other. In the indepen-
dent differentially private mechanisms prevalent in the literature, the additive noise is independent
across input databases. Such independence enables relatively easy design of the mechanism in
terms of the privacy-utility tradeoff. While such mechanisms are casually understood to offer “low
influence” of an individual on the query output, we show that they are not necessarily statistically
low influence in a formal sense. Even further, we show that if one were to enforce an arbitrarily
low influence on an independent differentially private mechanism, a heavy price would have
to be paid: the mechanism becomes trivial (statistically-speaking constant) and hence loses any
practical utility. The more general class of joint mechanisms not only allows differential privacy,
low influence, and utility to be jointly achieved, they also make the optimization of influence
linear over the mechanism space. However, this increases the dimension of the mechanism space
over which such optimization takes place.
An interesting direction for future research will be systematic low-complexity design of non-
independent, high-utility, low-influence, and differentially-private mechanisms. In addition, it
is worthwhile to formalize the counterpart of our results for continuous-valued queries and
mechanisms. Finally, we remark that the general framework of input-dependent joint mechanisms
that we studied in this paper may be of value in time-varying systems where data changes over
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time according to an inherent dynamical model or is gradually acquired and released (e.g., in
social networks or health systems), see for example [21], [22]. We propose further investigation
of a formal connection as future research.
APPENDIX
We begin by defining a function which measures the local influence of any two datasets.
Definition 9. Let V be a finite set. We define I : R|V|×|V|→ R, such that I(u, v) = 1−
∑V
i=1 uivi.
We relate this function to ι-LI for independent mechanisms in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let M : D → V be an independent mechanism and denote Mij = Pr[M(di) = vj ].
Then, M is ι-LI if and only if I(Mi,Mk) ≤ ι for every di ∼ dk.
Proof. By Proposition 5, M is ι-low influence if and only if, for every di ∼ dk,
ι ≤ Pr[M(di) 6=M(dk)] = 1− Pr[M(di) =M(dk)]
= 1−
|V|∑
j=1
Pr[M(di) = j]Pr[M(dk) = j] = 1−
|V|∑
j=1
MijMkj
= I(Mi,Mk).
It follows from the lemma that a lower bound on I for two neighboring datasets gives us a
lower bound on ι.
We now define generalized versions of the sets R∗ and S in Example 1.
Definition 10. Let V be a finite set. We define
R =
{
(u, v) ∈ R|V|×|V| : max
i∈[|V|]
ui = u1, max
i∈[|V|]
vi = v2,
|V|∑
i=1
ui =
|V|∑
i=1
vi = 1,
0 ≤ ui ≤ 1, 0 ≤ vi ≤ 1, for every i ∈ [|V|]
}
.
This set corresponds to nontrivial independent mechanisms in the following way.
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Lemma 2. Let M : D → V be a nontrivial independent mechanism and Mij = Pr[M(di) = vj ].
Then, there exist two neighboring datasets di ∼ dk such that (Mi,Mj) ∈ R.
Proof. Since M is nontrivial, there exist two neighboring datasets di ∼ dj such that
argmax
v∈V
Pr[M(d1) = v] 6= argmax
v∈V
Pr[M(d2) = v].
We order V = {v1, . . . , v|V |} such that
v1 = argmax
v∈V
Pr[M(di) = v], v2 = argmax
v∈V
Pr[M(dj) = v].
Then, by construction, (Mi,Mj) ∈ R.
Thus, a lower bound on I subject to R would give us a lower bound on ι for all nontrivial
independent mechanisms. To do this, we will consider the following set.
Definition 11. Let R be as in Definition 10. We define
S = {(u, v) ∈ R : ui = vi = 0 for every i ≥ 3}.
We show in Lemma 4 that the minimum of I over R is in S. To do this we need the following
construction.
Definition 12. Let (u, v) ∈ R, σu =
∑|V|
i=3 ui, σv =
∑|V|
i=3 vi. We define u
∗ ∈ R|V| such that
u∗1 = u1 +
Su
2
, u∗2 = u2 +
Su
2
, and u∗i = 0 for i ∈ |V| − {1, 2}. We also define v
∗ ∈ R|V| such
that v∗1 = v1 +
Sv
2
, v∗2 = v2 +
Sv
2
, and v∗i = 0 for i ∈ |V| − {1, 2}.
Thus, for any (u, v) ∈ R we can construct the point (u∗, v∗).
Lemma 3. Let (u, v) ∈ R. Then, (u∗, v∗) ∈ S ⊆ R.
Proof. Since u1 ≥ u2, it follows that
u∗1 = u1 +
Su
2
≥ u2 +
Su
2
= u∗2 ≥ ui = 0 for every i ∈ |V| − {1, 2}.
Also,
∑|V|
i=1 ui = u1 +
Su
2
+ u2 +
Su
2
= 1. The same arguments hold for v∗. Thus, (u∗, v∗) ∈
R
|V|×|V|.
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We now show that the minimum of I over R is in S.
Lemma 4. Let (u, v) ∈ R. Then, I(u∗, v∗) ≤ I(u, v). And therefore,
min
(u,v)∈R
I(u, v) = min
(u,v)∈S
I(u, v).
Proof. Since,
|V|∑
i=3
u1vi ≥
|V|∑
i=3
uivi and
|V|∑
i=3
uiv2 ≥
|V|∑
i=3
uivi,
it follows that,
I(u∗, v∗) = 1−
|V|∑
i=1
u∗i v
∗
i = 1−
(
u1 +
Su
2
)(
v1 +
Sv
2
)
−
(
u2 +
Su
2
)(
v2 +
Sv
2
)
= 1− u1v1 − u1
Sv
2
− v1
Su
2
−
Su
2
Sv
2
− u2v2 − u2
Sv
2
− v2
Su
2
−
Su
2
Sv
2
≤ 1− u1v1 − u2v2 − u1
Sv
2
− v2
Su
2
= 1− u1v1 − u2v2 −
1
2
|V|∑
i=3
u1vi −
1
2
|V|∑
i=3
uiv2
≤ 1−
|V|∑
i=1
uivi = I(u, v).
To conclude our proof we must minimize I over S.
Lemma 5. Let (u, v) ∈ S. Then, min(u,v)∈S I(u, v) =
1
2
Proof. Since u∗2 = 1− u
∗
1, v
∗
2 = 1 − v
∗
1 , minimizing I over R is equivalent to minimizing over
the same two-dimensional space defined in (2) of Example 1,
R∗ =
{
(u, v) ∈ R2 :
1
2
≤ u ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ v ≤
1
2
}
.
Thus, as shown in the example, min(u,v)∈R∗ I(u, v) =
1
2
.
We are ready to prove our theorem.
Theorem 1. Let M : D → V be an independent, ι-LI, nontrivial mechanism. Then, ι ≥ 1
2
.
Furthermore, this bound is tight.
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Proof. By Lemma 2, there exists two neighboring datasets di ∼ dk such that (Mi,Mj) ∈ R.
Lemmas 4 and 5 imply that I(Mi,Mj) ≥
1
2
. But then, by Lemma 1, ι ≥ 1
2
.
To see that the bound is tight, assume d1 ∼ d2 and set M11 = M12 =
1
2
, M1j = 0 for j > 2,
Mi2 = 1, and Mij = 0 for all the other i and j. Then,
I(Mi,Mk) =


1
2
if i = 1 or k = 1 ,
0 otherwise.
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